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A SPECIAL LECTURE BY
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET.)
The Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center at IIT Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law, with support from the Institute of the Supreme Court of
the United States (ISCOTUS) and the Jack Miller Center, is proud to
have hosted a special lecture by Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.) on
October 3, 2012. Justice Stevens, who had recused himself from hear-
ing a case called Stop the Beach Renourishment when he was a sitting
justice, presented his views on the case as a retired justice. He used
this lecture to respond to Justice Scalia, who had spoken about the
same case at Chicago-Kent when visiting a year earlier. Justice Ste-
vens graciously allowed the Chicago-Kent Law Review to publish his
lecture. It is fitting that his lecture appears in a symposium devoted to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center at Chicago-Kent also
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THE NINTH VOTE IN THE “STOP THE BEACH” CASE 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS (RET.) 
IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW 
Chicago, Illinois 
October 3, 2012 
One thing that I have especially missed during my retirement is debat-
ing points of law with my former colleague, Justice Scalia. I think he may 
also miss those debates because last year when he delivered an address at 
Chicago-Kent College of Law discussing the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection,1 he went out of his way to describe my opinion for 
the Court in Kelo v. City of New London2 as unpopular and unfaithful to the 
text of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and therefore not “long for 
this world.”3 A few months later, in the Albritton Lecture at the University 
of Alabama Law School, I explained why our decision in Kelo was so un-
popular, and how it was the dissenters, rather than the majority in Kelo,
who wanted to change a settled rule of law.4 Today I do not propose to 
repeat what I said in Alabama. Instead, I shall discuss the topic of judicial 
takings, which was debated among only eight members of the Supreme 
Court in Stop the Beach because I had recused myself. 
Stop the Beach involved a challenge to the constitutionality of an im-
portant Florida state statute.5 Responding to extensive erosion of hundreds 
of miles of sand beaches on Florida’s coast, the State  
 1.  560 U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 3. Justice Antonin Scalia, IIT Chicago-Kent Keynote Address: Stop the Beach Renourishment
(Oct. 18, 2011).  
 4.  Justice John Paul Stevens, University of Alabama Albritton Lecture: Kelo, Popularity,
and Substantive Due Process (Nov. 16, 2011). The criticism of the Kelo decision did not 
suggest that the $442,000 that Susette Kelo received from the City of New London in 2006 
failed to provide her with “just compensation” for the taking of property she had purchased in 
1997 for $53,500. See JEFF BENEDICT, LITTLE PINK HOUSE: A TRUE STORY OF DEFIANCE AND 
COURAGE (2009).
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of Florida enacted its Beach and Shore Preservation Act in 1961.6 Since the 
1970s, over 200 miles of beaches have benefitted from restoration projects 
authorized by that statute.7 Before the Act was amended in 1970, the border 
between privately-owned beach property and the state-owned submerged 
lands under the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean was a constantly 
changing line established by common law rules.8 Under those rules, the 
border was the mean high-water line (MHL) measured by the average reach 
of high tide over the preceding nineteen years; the strip of sand on the 
shore between the low-tide line and the MHL, like the permanently sub-
merged land, belonged to the State.9 Gradual additions to the land, caused 
by forces of nature, became the property of the beach owner, while gradual 
losses of beach moved the property line in the other direction.10 Sudden 
and dramatic changes caused, for example, by hurricanes, and known as 
avulsions, did not change the preexisting boundary between public and 
private property.11
The 1970 amendment to the Florida statute effectively treated a beach 
restoration project like an avulsion.12 Under the amended statute, the com-
mon law no longer operates to increase or decrease the privately-owned 
property in or adjacent to the restored beach.13 Instead, an “erosion control 
line”—set by reference to the current MHL—now serves as the permanent 
border separating public and private property.14 The statute contains other 
provisions that protect property owners by guarding their access to and 
view of the water15 and establishing procedures for determining compensa-
tion for any necessary taking of property.16 But it unquestionably authoriz-
es projects that eliminate some property owners’ right to accretions of 
land.17
 6.  Id. (citing 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61-246, as amended, FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011-161.45 
(2007)); Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1107-08 (Fla. 
2008).
 7.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Florida Shore and Beach Preservation Association et 
al. in Support of Respondents at 6, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot., 1 3 0  S .  C t .  2 5 9 2  ( 2 0 1 0 )  ( No. 08-1151). 
 8.  Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598-99. 
 9. Id. at 2597-98.
 10. Id. at 2598-99.
 11. Id.
 12. 1970 Fla. Laws ch. 70-276.
 13. Id. at  § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT.  § 161.191(2)); Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599.
 14.  1970 Fla. Laws ch. 70-276, §§ 2-3 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 161.141, 161.151(3), 
161.161); Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599.
 15. FLA. STAT.  §§ 161.021, 161.052, 161.053, 161.191(2).
 16. FLA. STAT.  §§ 161.212(2), (3).
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In 2003, a city and county on the coast of the Gulf of Mexico applied 
for permits to restore almost seven miles of beach by dredging sand from 
deep water and depositing it along the shore.18 A nonprofit corporation 
representing owners of beachfront property, called Stop the Beach Renour-
ishment, Inc., objected to the project, contending that it would destroy the 
owners’ right to future accretions as well  
as the right to retain contact between their property and the water.19 The 
state agency approved the project, but the Florida District Court of Appeal 
set aside that approval.20 That court certified to the Florida Supreme Court 
the question of whether the statute was unconstitutional, apparently refer-
ring only to the Florida Constitution, rather than the Federal Constitution.21
Over the dissent of two of the state court justices, the Florida Supreme 
Court held that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face.22  The plain-
tiffs had not specifically challenged the application of the statute to their 
property, and the Florida Supreme Court’s decision did not foreclose future 
challenges to applications of the law.23 In its opinion, the court explained 
that the appellate court had failed to recognize the similarity between the 
common-law rule that preserves an existing property line following an 
avulsive event and the statutory setting of a property line that remains the 
same during and after a restoration project.24
The Stop the Beach corporation filed a petition for rehearing in the 
Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the court’s decision had so flagrantly 
misconstrued Florida law that the decision itself amounted to a judicial 
taking that violated the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.25 The 
Florida Supreme Court denied the rehearing petition without opinion.26
Presumably nothing in the petition persuaded that court that it had misin-
terpreted Florida law. It would necessarily follow, I suppose, that the court 
did not believe that any possible state law error was so egregious that it 
amounted to a violation of the United States Constitution. Indeed, with 
respect to the federal issue, which was first raised in the petition for rehear-
ing, the Florida Court might simply have decided that it was too late to 
 18. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008). 
 23. Id. at 1115-16.
 24. Id. at 1116-18.
 25. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
 26. See Florida Supreme Court Docket for Case Nos. SC06-1447 & SC06-1449 (Dec. 18, 
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raise questions that were not encompassed within the question certified by 
the intermediate appellate court.27
Following the Florida Supreme Court’s denial of the rehearing peti-
tion, Stop the Beach petitioned for certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court.28 I participated in the Conference at which the certiorari petition was 
considered. At that time I did not see how the outcome of the case could 
possibly impact the value of the condominium that my wife Maryan owns 
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, or my own enjoyment of one of the most beau-
tiful beaches in the world.The thought of disqualifying myself did not oc-
cur to me then. After the Court granted certiorari, however, news stories 
suggesting that we might have an interest in the outcome persuaded me to 
recuse myself, so I did not thereafter participate in the decision of the 
case.29 Had I done so, I would have tried to persuade my colleagues to 
dismiss the case as having been improvidently granted review because 
there was no justification for using it as a vehicle for discussing the subject 
of judicial takings. 
Ultimately, my recusal did not affect the Court’s disposition of the 
case. Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer explained in their separate 
opinions that there was no need to decide the judicial takings issue since 
the Court unanimously agreed that there was no merit to the claim that 
Florida’s actions constituted any form of taking.30 Nevertheless, Justice 
Scalia wrote an opinion that spoke for a plurality of four justices in espous-
ing a theory of “judicial takings.”31 The remainder of his opinion spoke for 
the entire Court in affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
there had been no taking.32 In his talk at this law school last year, he was 
critical of his colleagues for their failure to join his advisory opinion about 
the subject of judicial takings. 
 27. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.330(a) (2007) (“A motion for rehearing .  .  . shall not 
present issues not previously raised in the proceeding.”); id .  at note on 2000 Amendment 
(“The amendment .  . . codifies the decisional laws prohibition against issues in post-decision 
motions that have not previously been raised in the proceeding.”); Cleveland v. State of Florida,
887 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“No new ground or position may be assumed in a 
petition for rehearing.”).
 28. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
 29. See, e.g., Behind Justice Stevens’ Recusal in Florida Case, THE BLOG OF LEGALTIMES
(Dec. 4, 2009), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/12/behind-justice-stevens-recusal-in-florida-case.html.  
 30. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); i d .  at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
 31. Id. at 2601 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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Had I participated in deciding the case, I also would have refused to 
join Justice Scalia’s advisory opinion, and probably would have identified 
at least three reasons for not discussing the subject of judicial takings in 
that case. First, if there had been any taking in the case, it would not have 
been a “judicial” taking. Any taking that might have occurred was effected 
either when the Florida state legislature passed the statute authorizing the 
creation of new permanent unchanging property lines to replace the ever-
changing common-law lines, or when the agency actually set the property 
lines that would preclude petitioners from acquiring further land by accre-
tion. The main significance of Justice Scalia’s characterization—that an 
appellate court’s approval of challenged executive or legislative action is a 
“judicial taking” rather than solely a decision on the merits of an underly-
ing takings challenge—was to provide a special procedural benefit to prop-
erty owners who, like Stop the Beach, fail to claim a violation of the Feder-
Federal Constitution until after state courts have rejected their state law 
claim. 
As Justice Scalia explained in a footnote to his opinion, “[the Court] 
ordinarily do[es] not consider an issue first presented to a state  
court in a petition for rehearing if the state court did not address it.”33 “But 
where the state-court decision itself is claimed to constitute a violation of 
federal law,” Justice Scalia wrote, “the state court’s refusal to address that 
claim put forward in a petition for rehearing will not bar our review.”34 For 
that proposition, Justice Scalia cited Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the 
Court in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,35 but that case did 
not create a broad exception from ordinary procedural rules. It merely held 
that the state could not refuse to provide a taxpayer with any hearing what-
soever on its constitutional claim.36 In Stop the Beach, however, the plain-
tiff corporation had ample opportunity to be heard. It could have raised a 
federal constitutional challenge to the alleged state taking under the Florida 
beach preservation statute well before its rehearing petition in the Florida 
Supreme Court. Indeed, the corporation’s lawyers could have raised it, but 
did not, in the state court proceedings along with the corporation’s state 
constitutional challenge. 
Perhaps the most glaring omission in Justice Scalia’s opinion is his 
failure to explain why there is any need to create a special procedural ex-
ception for property owners whose lawyers fail to advance a federal claim 
 33.  Id. at 2601 n.4.
 34. Id.
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in state proceedings.  He cites only one case to illustrate the importance of 
policing judicial takings: Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
in which county officials applied a Florida statute that expressly deemed 
interest on certain funds deposited with the courts to be public money.37
Ironically, however, conventional appellate procedural rules enabled the 
Supreme Court in Webb’s to decide the federal question: the plaintiff there 
had challenged the state statute on federal constitutional grounds before the 
Florida Supreme Court, which had found no unconstitutional taking.38 In 
Webb’s, unlike in Stop the Beach, the federal question was preserved and 
clearly passed on by the state court. 
The second point I would have stressed, had I participated in deciding 
Stop the Beach, is that it is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, rather than the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that 
gives federal courts the authority to decide whether state judicial decisions 
announcing new rules of law violate the Federal Constitution. While the 
Court’s 1897 decision in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago39 is often 
cited for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause has 
been incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore applies to 
state action,40 in fact Chicago did not even cite the Fifth Amendment. As 
Justice Scalia more accurately stated in his Stop the Beach plurality opin-
ion, Chicago held “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits uncompensated takings.”41 In reaching that conclusion, the 
Chicago Court also answered in the affirmative the antecedent question 
whether the Due Process Clause applies to matters of substance as well as 
procedure.42
 37. 449 U.S. 155 (1980). 
 38. Id. at 159 n.5.  
 39. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
 40. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2613 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Chicago, 166 U.S. at 239); Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 n.1 (2005) (same); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84
(1994) (same); Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (same); see also
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 n.5 (1980); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827, 836 n.4 (1987).
 41. 130 S. Ct. at 2603 (plurality opinion).
 42. “But a State may not, by any of its agencies, disregard the prohibitions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Its judicial authorities may keep within the letter of the statute pre-
scribing forms of procedure in the courts and give the parties interested the fullest opportuni-
ty to be heard, and yet it might be that its final action would be inconsistent with that 
amendment. In determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, not to 
form. This court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, has said: ‘ Can a State make any-
thing due process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm 
this is to hold that the prohibition to the States is of no avail, or has no application where 
the invasion of private rights is effected under the forms of state legislation.’” Chicago, 166 
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While Justice Scalia correctly described Chicago’s holding, his Stop
the Beach opinion elsewhere overlooks the difference between the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. For example, at the outset of its discussion of 
the Court’s takings jurisprudence, Justice Scalia’s opinion cites Yates v. 
Milwaukee, a case decided in 1871,43 for the proposition that the “Takings 
Clause—’nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation,’ U.S. Const., Amdt 5—applies as fully to the taking of a 
landowner’s riparian rights as it does to the taking of an estate in land.”44 In 
fact, Yates, like Chicago, took the form of a substantive due process case 
that did not even cite the Fifth Amendment.45
The primary difference between the two Amendments, of course, is 
that the Fifth limits the power of the federal government, while the Four-
teenth limits the power of states. Even if we assume that the scope of the 
Fifth Amendment’s limitation on the scope of a government’s power to 
condemn private property is coextensive with the Fourteenth’s, it is note-
worthy that neither the text nor the history of the Fifth Amendment’s Tak-
ings Clause places any limit on the scope of that power; the Clause imposes 
only a requirement that just compensation be provided for a taking.46 Prior 
to the adoption of the Constitution, uncompensated takings had occurred 
both in England and in some states.47 That history explains why the text of 
the Takings Clause prohibits uncompensated takings. 
But the text does not limit the circumstances in which the government 
may take property. Instead, under the common law, as well as under the 
 43. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1871). 
 44. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (citing Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 504).
 45. Yates, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 504 (“This riparian right is property . . . and, though it 
must be enjoyed in due subjection to the rights of the public, it cannot be arbitrarily or capri-
ciously destroyed or impaired. It is a right of which, when once vested, the owner can only be 
deprived in accordance with established law, and if necessary that it be taken for the public 
good, upon due compensation.”).
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), acknowledges 
this compensation-focused nature of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. As he wrote,  
As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently noted, [the Takings Clause] 
does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exer-
cise of that power. This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is de-
signed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. 
Id. at 314 (citations omitted) (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank 
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 173, 194 (1985); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297, 297 n.40 (1981); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932); Monongahela 
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 
518 (1883)).
 47. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and 





      05/13/2013   14:40:30
33531-ckt_88-2 Sheet No. 145 Side B      05/13/2013   14:40:30
12-STEVENS-HP2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/7/2013 9:33 AM
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Due Process Clause, it was assumed that any taking, just like any regula-
tion of the use of private property, must be justified by a public purpose.48
The omission in the Takings Clause of any textual restriction on when the 
taking power may be exercised is consistent with the view that the prohibi-
tion against deprivations of property without due process expressed in both 
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments is the true source of the prohibi-
tion against takings for a purely private purpose. 
In both his Chicago-Kent talk last year, in which he referred to “the 
absurd notion of substantive process,”49 and in Stop the Beach, Justice 
Scalia argued that the Due Process Clause cannot do the work of the Tak-
ings Clause. For a jurist who stresses the importance of text  
in the analysis of most legal questions, that argument is surprising. The 
prohibition against deprivations of property “without due process of law” 
in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment is more naturally read to extend to 
state judicial decisions on property law than is the text of the Fifth 
Amendment, which—as I have explained—merely prohibits federal takings 
without just compensation. Moreover, in the only opinion I have found by a 
member of the Supreme Court that would have treated a state appellate 
court opinion as the equivalent of a “judicial taking”—Justice Stewart’s 
solo writing in Hughes v. Washington—reliance was placed solely upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth.50 (Notably, Hughes, like Webb’s 
Fabulous Pharmacies, decided the merits of a takings claim by following 
conventional rules of appellate procedure.) 
If the Court is to adopt a new judge-made doctrine expanding  
its authority to review the constitutionality of state appellate court opinions, 
it should be called “judicial deprivations” rather  
than “judicial takings,” for surely such a doctrine should  
apply to deprivations of liberty as well as deprivations of property. Beach 
restoration projects affect public beaches as well as  
private beaches, and may affect liberty interests as well as property inter-
ests.  Such projects theoretically could result in unconstitutional rules that 
 48. See, e.g., Justice Stevens, supra note 4 ; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 
U.S. 527 (1906); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 
(1798). 
 49. Justice Scalia, I I T  Chicago-Kent Keynote Address, supra note 3 .
 50. 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Although the State in 
this case made no attempt to take the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved 
the same result by effecting a retroactive transformation of private into public proper-
ty-without paying for the privilege of doing so. Because the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids such confiscation by a State, no less through its courts 
than through its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended that when it is 
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deprive individual citizens of previously established rights to use public 
beaches and to walk along the shore of private beaches in  
the area between the high-water mark and the low-water mark. If the Flori-
da Supreme Court were to adopt a rule limiting beach access to citizens 
who provide photo identification proving their local residency—or, to take 
a more clearly unconstitutional deprivation of liberty, a rule limiting access 
to members of a preferred political party or a preferred race—the depriva-
tion would be so egregious that appellate review of the judicial decision 
itself in the United States Supreme Court might well be justified even be-
fore the new judicial rule was enforced against a particular individual. I can 
find no principled basis for creating a new rule of appellate procedure that 
gives greater protection to property interests than to liberty interests 
when—as I have explained—both claims are, at bottom, due process chal-
lenges to action by a state. 
In arguing that substantive due process cannot do the work of the Tak-
ings Clause, Justice Scalia relied on two opinions expressing a crabbed 
view of that doctrine—the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, and Jus-
tice Black’s opinion for the Court in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. 
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.51 The former involved the deprivation of 
an interest in liberty;52 the latter involved the validity of an economic regu-
lation that was not claimed to be a taking.53
The question in Albright was whether the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment constrains the power of state government to accuse 
a citizen of an infamous crime without probable cause.54 Unlike the five 
other opinions in Albright,55 none of which commanded a majority, I 
thought that the Clause applied and required the State to establish “the 
probable guilt of the defendant” before making a formal accusation.56 In 
1884, in Hurtado v. California, the Court had held that the State could use 
a procedure other than a grand jury to meet that requirement, but that was 
far different from a holding that there was no need for any probable cause 
 51. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606
(2010) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (plurality opinion); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union 
v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)). 
 52. Albright, 510 U.S. at 269. 
 53. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union, 335 U.S. at 527-29.
 54. Albright, 510 U.S. at 268.
 55. Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring); id.
at 276 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. 
at 286 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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determination.57 My dissenting opinion explained at some length how the 
Court had rejected Justice Black’s view that the express guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights marked the outer limits of due process protection.58 Instead, I 
explained, the Court had endorsed the reasoning in Justice Harlan’s elo-
quent dissent in Poe v. Ullman, which described substantive due process as 
a guarantee of “freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and pur-
poseless restraints.”59
Justice Black’s opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union is, unsurpris-
ingly, consistent with his narrow view of the guarantees afforded by sub-
stantive due process. As my Albright opinion explained, however, that view 
was rejected by the Court as time went on. While Justice Scalia cited Lin-
coln Federal Labor Union for the proposition that the “liberties” protected 
by substantive due process do not include economic liberties,60 it seems to 
me more accurate to say that Lincoln is one of many post-New Deal deci-
sions that apply a deferential rational basis standard of review to economic 
regulations adopted by democratically elected legislatures and executives.61
 Moreover, in the 1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, my 
opinion concurring in the judgment expressed the view that the doctrine of 
substantive due process applied to invalidate a municipal zoning ordinance 
that placed an unjustified limitation on a grandmother’s use of her proper-
ty.62  And substantive due process was the explicit basis for the 1897 de-
cision in Chicago, which remains the principal authority for federal review 
of state taking decisions.63
It is true that the Court is always appropriately cautious whenever it is 
asked to apply the doctrine of substantive due process in new areas, as I 
noted in my opinion for a unanimous Court in Collins v. City of Harker 
 57. 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (“[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a 
presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information after exami-
nation and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, 
with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses pro-
duced for the prosecution, is not due process of law . . . . [I]n every circumstance of its administration, as 
authorized by the statute of California, it carefully considers and guards the substantial interest of the 
prisoner.” (emphasis added)). 
 58. Albright, 510 U.S. at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
 59. Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
 60. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2606.  
 61. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union, 335 U.S. at 533-37.
 62. 431 U.S. 494, 496, 502-04, 506 (1977) (plurality opinion); id. at 520 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 548 (White, J., dissenting).
 63. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234-35 (1897) (“In determin-
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Heights.64 Still, it is quite wrong to say, as Justice Scalia did, that this doc-
trine, which has developed over the years through the common-law process 
of adjudication and is appropriately respectful of judicial precedent, is “so 
flabby, so susceptible to judicial ipse dixit, that it creates a huge reservoir 
of discretion (that is to say, power) in the courts.”65 On occasion, a majori-
ty of the Supreme Court has misused the doctrine, most notably in the 
Lochner case,66 and again recently in McDonald v. Chicago, which held 
that a constitutional provision—the Second Amendment—that was adopted 
to protect state control of their own militias should give federal judges a 
veto power over state regulations relating to firearms.67 But generally 
speaking, in the area of takings by state official action, the Court’s reliance 
on substantive due process doctrine—often articulated as the “incorpora-
tion” of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause into the Fourteenth 
Amendment—has produced an acceptable body of law. 
My third point can be briefly summarized. In his famous concurring 
opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Justice Brandeis co-
gently identified several rules that then limited the  
Court’s approach to the adjudication of constitutional questions.68  Two of 
those rules are relevant to our discussion today: first, “[t]he Court will not 
‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it.’”69 Second, “[t]he Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitu-
tional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied.’”70 The rule defining “judicial takings” that Justice Scalia formu-
lated in his Stop the Beach opinion and urged the Court to endorse would 
have violated both of these rules of judicial restraint that I have quoted. 
Moreover, the heavy reliance on preexisting state property law in Jus-
tice Scalia’s opinion appears to vary from this comment by Justice Brande-
is about federal courts’ duty to defer to state judicial decisions—including 
those that change preexisting common law rules: 
The process of trial and error, of change of decision in order to con-
form with changing ideas and conditions, is traditional with courts adminis-
tering the common law.Since it is for the state courts to interpret and 
 64. 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, the Court has always been reluc-
tant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”).
 65. Justice Scalia, IIT Chicago-Kent Keynote Address, supra note 3 .
 66. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
 67. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
 68. 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
 69. Id. at 346.
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declare the law of the State, it is for them to correct their errors and declare 
what the law has been as well as what it is. State courts, like this Court, 
may ordinarily overrule their own decisions without offending constitu-
tional guaranties, even though parties may have acted to their prejudice on 
the faith of the earlier decisions.71
In Stop the Beach, there was no need for the Court to fashion a new 
rule of federal law for “judicial takings” or “judicial deprivations” or to 
referee the dispute between the majority and the dissenters on the Florida 
Supreme Court over questions of Florida law. Moreover, the Court should 
not have reached the merits of the underlying takings challenge to the Flor-
ida statute without applying ordinary procedural rules—that is, without first 
determining whether the federal claim had been decided by the Florida 
Supreme Court or at least presented to that court earlier than in the rehear-
ing petition. I am sure Justice Brandeis would not have joined Justice Scal-
ia’s plurality opinion in Stop the Beach. Nor do I believe that Justice 
Brandeis would have found the reasoning in Justice Scalia’s comments 
about that case in this forum last year persuasive. Those comments surely 
would not have affected my vote had I not been recused. 
 71. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8 (1930).
